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Complete Abstract: 
In computational markets utilizing algorithms that establish a general equilibrium, competitive behavior is 
usually assumed: each agent makes its demand (supply) decisions so as to maximize its utility (profit) 
assuming that it has no impact on market prices. However, there is a potential gain from strategic 
behavior via speculating about others because an agent does affect the market prices, which affect the 
supply/demand decisions of others, which again affect the market prices that the agent faces. 
Determining the optimal strategy when the speculator has perfect knowledge about the other agents is a 
well known problem which has been studied in oligopoly theory in economics. We describe the 
computation of such a strategy, and focus on an issue that has received little attention in economics, but 
which is of fundamental importance in computational markets: the revelation of demand strategies that 
drive the market to the desired equilibrium. The more realistic setting where the speculator has imperfect 
information about the other agents is more delicate. We demonstrate how speculation under biased 
beliefs about the other agents can result in considerable losses if traditional oligopoly strategies for 
perfect information are used. Furthermore, we show how the optimal demand is computed from 
probability distributions on the other agents' supply/demand functions. We also theoretically show when 
an optimal revealed demand function can be constructed independently of the probability distributions. 
Some pragmatics of choosing a demand function in the case of imperfect information (particularly useful 
for construction of computational agents for equilibrium markets) are given, and we show - with some 
empirical support - that it can be relatively easy to construct demand functions that results in a gain from 
speculation, even when estimation errors are large. Finally, game theoretic issues related to multiple 
agents counterspeculating simultaneously are discussed. 


















































